Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure: The Price for Participation Just Went up, Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students Involved in Extracurricular Activities via the Fourth Amendment by Brewster, Lisa K.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 79 Number 4 Article 6 
2003 
Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure: The Price for 
Participation Just Went up, Mandatory Suspicionless Drug 
Testing of Students Involved in Extracurricular Activities via the 
Fourth Amendment 
Lisa K. Brewster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brewster, Lisa K. (2003) "Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure: The Price for Participation Just Went 
up, Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students Involved in Extracurricular Activities via the Fourth 
Amendment," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 79 : No. 4 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol79/iss4/6 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
THE PRICE FOR PARTICIPATION JUST WENT UP,
MANDATORY SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING
OF STUDENTS INVOLVED IN EXTRACURRICULAR
ACTIVITIES VIA THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92
of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)
I. FACTS
Tecumseh, Oklahoma, is a rural city located approximately forty miles
southeast of Oklahoma City.' The Tecumseh School District (School Dis-
trict) adopted the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy (Policy) in the fall
of 1998, requiring all middle and high school students who wished to
participate in any extracurricular activity to consent to drug testing.2 The
Policy was applied to competitive extracurricular activities such as athletics,
band, choir, cheerleading, the academic team, and Future Homemakers of
America.3 The Policy required students to take a urinalysis drug test prior
to participating in any activity, submit to random drug testing while con-
tinuing to participate in the activity, and agree to a drug test at any time
upon reasonable suspicion.4 The urinalysis test was designed to detect the
use of illegal drugs, including amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
and barbiturates, not medical conditions or the presence of authorized
prescription medications. 5
Both respondents attended Tecumseh High School at the time of the
suit.6 Respondent Lindsay Earls was a member of the show choir, the
marching band, the academic team, and the National Honor Society.7
1. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
826 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. The Policy was applicable to students participating in any extracurricular activity, but
in practice the test had only been applied to competitive extracurricular activities sanctioned by




7. Id. Lindsay Earls participated in a range of extracurricular activities to increase her
chances of getting into a "competitive college." Brief for Respondents at 5, Bd. of Educ. of Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332). She is
currently attending Dartmouth, but she was a high school sophomore when the suit was filed. Id.
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Respondent Daniel James sought to participate in the Academic Team.8
The respondents, with their parents, challenged the Policy on its face and as
it applied to their participation in extracurricular activities through a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the School District.9 The respondents alleged
that the Policy violated the Fourth Amendment and asked for injunctive and
declarative relief.' 0 They also argued that the School District did not iden-
tify a special need for testing students who participate in extracurricular
activities.'] In addition, the respondents argued that the Policy did not ad-
dress a proven drug problem, nor did it promise to bring any benefit to the
students or the school.' 2
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
upheld the Policy by granting summary judgment in favor of the School
District.13 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision because the student drug use in Pottawatomie was far from an epi-
demic or an immediate crisis. 14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held that the Policy was constitutional because drug testing was a reason-
able means of furthering the School District's interest in preventing and
deterring drug use, and therefore, the Policy did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 15
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
8. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
826 (2002). The School District challenged Daniel James' standing to sue because his failing
grades made him ineligible for the academic team, but the district court held that it was irrelevant
because Lindsay Earls had standing and therefore the court would address the constitutional
question. Id. at 827.
9. Id. The statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
10. Earls, 536 U.S. at 827.
11. Id. In its applications for federal funding, the School District identified few instances of
drug use, and of those identified, rarely did they involve students participating in non-athletic
activities. Respondents' Brief at 1, Earls (No. 01-332).
12. Earls, 536 U.S. at 827.
13. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, 115 F. Supp.
2d 1281, 1296 (W.D. Okla. 2000).
14. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, 242 F.3d
1264, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001).
15. Earls, 536 U.S. at 828.
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seizures."16 The United States Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to
this rule and has determined that "reasonable searches and seizures" are ac-
ceptable in the public school setting.' 7 The Court has stated that "reason-
able searches and seizures" are allowed without a warrant or probable cause
if a special need exists.
18
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES
In order to understand the result of Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,19 one must
examine the development of the Fourth Amendment and suspicionless
searches. 20 Earls was a clarification of several previous cases heard by the
Supreme Court, culminating with the application of suspicionless drug test-
ing of students participating in extracurricular activities. 21 The Court's
decision allows another exception to Fourth Amendment protection from
suspicionless searches.
22
1. The Relaxation of the Fourth Amendment Begins with the
Removal of Probable Cause
In Griffin v. Wisconsin,23 the United States Supreme Court created a
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment probable cause require-
ment for a search. 24 Griffin, who had previously been convicted of a
felony, was on probation when his probation officer's supervisor received
information that Griffin had guns in his residence, which violated his
probation. 25 Wisconsin law allowed the search of a probationer's home
without a warrant "as long as his supervisor approve[d] and as long as there
[were] 'reasonable grounds' to believe the presence of contraband."
26
Police searched Griffin's home and found a handgun. 27 Griffin was
charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 28 Griffin moved
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985).
18. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
19. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
20. Earls, 536 U.S. at 828.
21. Id. at 827-28.
22. Id. at 828.
23. 483 U.S.-868 (1987).
24. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74.
25. Id. at 871.
26. Id. at 870-71.
27. Id. at 871.
28. Id. at 872.
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to suppress the evidence because the search was conducted without a
warrant, but the district court denied the motion.29
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision based on a
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable
cause for a search. 30 The Court reasoned that a search unsupported by
probable cause was constitutional when "special needs ... make the war-
rant and probable-cause requirement impractical." 31 The operation of a pro-
bation system was similar to that of a school, government office, or
prison-where special needs may justify departures from the usual warrant
and probable cause requirements. 32
Special needs exist when a warrant requirement would interfere and
cause delays in the probation system, making it more difficult to respond
quickly when evidence of misconduct was likely.33 The warrant require-
ment "would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious
searches would otherwise create." 34 Therefore, the search of Griffin's
residence was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the search
was performed as a regulation of the probation system and qualified as a
special need, which did not require probable cause and a warrant.35
2. Suspicionless Searches in Other Contexts
After Griffin, the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless drug testing
policies for railroad workers and customs officials because special needs
warrant the use of random drug testing. 36 In Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n,37 the Court held that safety regulations of the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) mandating alcohol and drug testing without
a warrant or individualized suspicion did not violate the Fourth Amendment
when conducted subsequent to certain train accidents.38 The Court empha-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 873.
31. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).
32. Id. at 873-74.
33. Id. at 876.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 880.
36. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (finding that (1)
railroads affected public safety and (2) drug and alcohol abuse were contributing factors in train
accidents; therefore, drug testing without probable cause after certain train accidents was a special
need and did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (implementing a drug testing program for employees seeking employ-
ment in positions that directly involved drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws, required
the employee to carry a firearm, or required the handling of classified materials).
37. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
38. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602. Post-accident, toxicological testing was mandated for railroad
employees directly involved in "certain specified events." Id. at 609. Testing was required after
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sized that the government's interest in ensuring the well being of employees
and passengers created "'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements." 39 Under these circumstances, the Court focused on the
balance between safety concerns in an already highly regulated industry and
the privacy expectations of employees.40
Before instituting the drug testing policy, the FRA reviewed accident
investigation reports which revealed evidence that drugs or alcohol were the
likely cause or a contributing factor in at least twenty-one significant train
accidents.4 1 The FRA addressed the drug and alcohol issue by instituting
the testing program. 42 Under these circumstances, the Court determined
that the privacy interests and the intrusion involved with a drug test were
minimal when compared to the substantial governmental interest and threats
to public safety.4 3 The Court emphasized the risk to public safety by stating
that "employees who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations can
cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable
to supervisors or others."44 In making its decision, the Court focused pri-
marily on the safety of the railroad employees and the public at large to
determine that the government interest outweighed the intrusiveness of the
search.45
The Supreme Court decision in Skinner was announced on the same
day as National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,46 which involved
similar Fourth Amendment issues.47 In Von Raab, the Court upheld the
"major train accidents," "impact accidents," and "fatal accidents." FRA Control of Alcohol and
Drug Use, Post-Accident Toxicological Testing, 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1)-(3) (1987). A "major
train accident" was defined as any accident that involved "(i) a fatality, (ii) the release of
hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a reportable injury, or (iii) damage to rail-
road property of $500,000 or more." Id. § 219.201(a)(1)(i)-(iii). An "impact accident" was
defined as "a collision that results in a reportable injury, or in damage to railroad property of
$50,000 or more." Id. § 219.201(a)(2). A "fatal train accident" was defined as "[any train
accident that involves a fatality to any on-duty railroad employee." Id. § 219.201(a)(3).
39. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)).
40. Id. at 624.
41. Id. at 607. In 1985, the FRA promulgated regulations that instituted a drug and alcohol
testing policy. Id. at 608. Prior to the program, the FRA identified twenty-five fatalities, sixty-
one non-fatal injuries, and property damage estimated at $19 million that were due to problems
with alcohol and drug use from 1972 to 1983. id. at 607.
42. Id. at 606.
43. Id. at 624. The Court stated that "where the privacy interests implicated by the search
are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable
despite the absence of such suspicion." Id.
44. Id. at 628.
45. Id. at 628-34.
46. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
47. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
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Customs Service's employee drug testing program as reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.4 8 This program required suspicionless drug testing of
employees applying for promotions to positions involving interdiction of
illegal drugs or requiring them to carry firearms.49
The Court, utilizing the same reasoning as in Skinner, stated that a
demonstrated special need was necessary in order to intrude upon ordinary
Fourth Amendment rights, and the Court must "balance the individual's pri-
vacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether
it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context." 50 In Von Raab, as in Skinner, the
reason for the drug testing was to deter drug use by employees involved in
safety sensitive occupations.51 The Court stated, "The public interest de-
mands effective measures to bar drug users from positions directly
involving the interdiction of illegal drugs. The public interest likewise
demands effective measures to prevent the promotion of drug users to
positions that require the incumbent to carry a firearm."52
The Court took specific notice of an already decreased level of privacy
expectation by customs officials, stating that successful performance of
their duties was dependent upon their mental and physical alertness, and
that these employees cannot reasonably expect to hide personal information
that was directly related to their fitness from the Service. 53 The Court again
focused on the compelling governmental interest at stake in addition to the
public safety risk that would result if any of the individuals subject to drug
testing were in fact using drugs.54
3. Searches in Public Schools Must be Reasonable
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,55 the Court stated, "[T]he special needs of the
school environment require assessment of the legality of such searches
against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause." 56  The
Supreme Court determined that the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment applied in the public school environment when school
48. Id. at 664.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 665-66.
51. Id. at 666.
52. Id. at 670.
53. Id. at 672.
54. Id. at 670-71.
55. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
56. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332 n.2 (1985).
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authorities conducted those searches. 57 The school search allowed in T.L.O.
was based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, not probable cause,
but the Court fell short of requiring individualized suspicion as an element
of the reasonableness standard.58
In T.L.O., two students were caught smoking in a school restroom by a
teacher.59 The teacher took the students to the assistant vice-principal's
office for questioning.60 While in the vice-principal's office, T.L.O.'s purse
was searched and cigarettes and marijuana were found.61 The State brought
delinquency charges against T.L.O., and she moved to suppress the evi-
dence, claiming the search was illegal.62 The New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the search was unreasonable and suppressed the evidence. 63 The
United States Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision and held that although the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures applied to searches conducted by public
school officials, the search of the student's purse was reasonable.64
The Supreme Court commented that a reasonableness determination
requires a twofold inquiry.65 First, consideration must be given to "whether
the... action was justified at its inception" and second, "whether the search
as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place."' 66 The Court reasoned
that searches were acceptable when there was a reasonable belief that the
search would reveal evidence of contraband or a violation of school rules. 67
The Court further reasoned that although a search may be reasonable, it
must also balance the governmental and privacy interests when probable
cause is not asserted.68
57. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337
58. Id. at 342-47.
59. Id. at 328.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 329. T.L.O. argued that the search of her purse was unlawful according to the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
63. Id. at 330-31.
64. Id. at 327-28.
65. Id. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967)).
66. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
67. Id. at 341-42.
68. Id. at 341.
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4. Suspicionless Drug Testing Finds a Limit
The trend allowing suspicionless drug testing hit a roadblock in Chan-
dler v. Miller69 when the Supreme Court struck down the State of Georgia's
mandatory drug testing program for candidates running for state office.70
Georgia did not provide any evidence of a particular drug abuse problem
among candidates for public office.71 The Court stated that a demonstrated
drug problem is not required for a suspicionless drug-testing scheme to be
valid, but it does "shore up an assertion of special need."7 2 The Court ex-
plained that a special needs exception requires a substantial and important
reason to conduct drug testing, one significant enough to "override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest."73 The facts in Chandler did
not give rise to a special need because Georgia failed to show that it had a
significant enough interest to justify drug testing of candidates running for
state office. 74 The Court emphasized that running for elected office did not
create a threat to public safety; therefore, a suspicionless drug testing policy
in that context was not constitutional.75
5. Suspicionless Drug Testing Allowed for Interscholastic
Athletes
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 76 the Supreme Court carved
out another exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable
cause for a search. 77 In Vernonia, Oregon, the School District adopted a
Student Athlete Drug Policy, which required a random urinalysis drug test
for any student participating in school athletics. 78 A seventh-grade student
and his parents filed suit against the School District when he was denied
69, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
70. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
71. Id. at 319. The state required candidates to submit a certificate from a state-approved
laboratory stating that the individual passed a urinalysis drug test taken within thirty days prior to
qualifying for nomination or election. Id. at 309.
72. Id. at 306.
73. Id. at 318.
74. Id. at 318. But see Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-68
(1989) (holding that drug testing for customs officials was a special need due to the safety impli-
cations involved, even without a demonstrated drug use problem).
75. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323. The Court stated that Georgia provided no evidence of a
drug problem among individuals running for elected office. Id. at 319. The Court also noted that
when public safety is not in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment does not allow suspicionless
searches. Id. at 323.
76. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
77. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
78. Id. at 648.
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participation in the football program because he refused to consent to a drug
test.79 The district court dismissed the suit based on the merits and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the policy violated
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 80 The Supreme Court vacated the
Ninth Circuit's decision and instituted a three-part balancing test to deter-
mine reasonableness. 81 The three-part test to determine reasonableness in-
cludes the following: (1) the nature of the privacy interests on which the
search intrudes;82 (2) the privacy interests compromised by the character of
the intrusion; 83 and (3) the nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern and the efficacy of the means for meeting the concern. 84
Applying the first prong of the test, the Court determined that the
nature of the privacy interest was acceptable because the traditional role of
the school system was "custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of super-
vision and control that could not be exercised over free adults." 85 By recog-
nizing a supervisory relationship between school authorities and students,
the Court determined that students have a lessened degree of privacy. 86 The
Court went on to address the fact that students participating in athletics
have a lesser privacy expectation due to the communal nature of dressing
rooms and personal hygiene facilities. 87
Next the Court analyzed the character of the intrusion. Using the
second prong of the balancing test, the Court found that "the privacy
interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine sample [were]
negligible" because the conditions were very similar to using a public
restroom. 88
The final consideration in the three-part test deals with the govern-
mental concern and the efficacy of using the drug test to meet that
79. Id. at 651.
80. Id. at 651-52.
81. Id. at 652-66. The three-part reasonableness test used in Vernonia was the same as the
two-part test that was used in T.L.O., but because individualized suspicion existed in T.L.O., there
was no need to weigh the privacy intrusion against the government's interest. See New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-44 (1985).
82. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.
83. Id. at 658.
84. Id. at 660.
85. Id. at 654-56.
86. Id. at 654-57.
87. Id. at 657. "Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not
notable for the privacy they afford." Id.
88. Id. at 658. The District's policy required male students to produce a urine sample at a
urinal while they were fully clothed and monitored from behind. Id. Female students produced
urine samples inside an enclosed stall with a monitor standing outside listening for signs of
tampering. Id. The Court said that these conditions were similar to those "typically encountered
in public restrooms" used daily by men, women, and schoolchildren. Id.
2003]
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concern.89 The Court did not require a compelling state interest with a
"fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern," but it did require an
"important enough" interest to justify the particular search. 90 It found that
the Vernonia School District tailored its drug testing policy to impact only
those students who were most influential in causing the District's "im-
mediate crisis." 9' The policy was directed toward athletes who were leading
the drug use movement and whose own drug use presented a risk of signifi-
cant physical harm to themselves and to other students. 92 The school was
experiencing a drug epidemic among student athletes and the Court
reasoned that "the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use ... is effectively
addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs." 93 After applying
the three-part test, the Court concluded that the Vernonia School District's
policy of drug testing athletes was reasonable and constitutional. 94
B. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
In determining whether a search was constitutional, the Court began in
Griffin by removing probable cause and confirming that the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness standard applies when special needs exist.95 Expand-
ing the special needs context to public schools, the Court in T.L.O. held
that probable cause was not necessary for a search by school officials. 96 In
T.L.O., the Court identified a two-prong test for determining reasonable-
ness. 97 The test evaluated the character of the privacy intrusion and
whether the search was justified.98
89. Id. at 660.
90. Id. at 661.
91. Id. at 662-63.
92. Id. Supreme Court rulings prior to Vernonia on the constitutionality of suspicionless
drug tests also stressed the risk of physical harm to the individual using drugs or to others who
come in contact with the individual using drugs. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 628 (1989). This risk was crucial in establishing a sufficient interest by the government
in compelling individuals to participate in suspicionless drug tests. Id. For example, in Skinner,
the Court stated:
Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to
others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.
Much like persons who have routine access to dangerous nuclear power facilities, em-
ployees who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations can cause great human
loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others.
Id. (citation omitted).
93. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).
94. Id. at 664-65.
95. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987).
96. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985).
97. Id. at 341.
98. Id. at 341-42.
[VOL. 79:983
CASE COMMENT
In Skinner and Von Raab, the Court carved out another exception to the
Fourth Amendment when special needs exist by removing individualized
suspicion for a search when the health and safety of the public is involved.99
However, in Chandler, the Court held that candidates running for office
P
could not be subjected to a drug testing policy because public safety was
not in jeopardy.100 The Court reasoned that political candidates did not
create a special need sufficient enough to justify removal of individualized
suspicion.101
In the public school context, the Court upheld the reasonableness stan-
dard when the Vernonia School District instituted a drug testing policy for
athletes.102 In Vernonia, a three-part test determined whether a search was
reasonable when balanced against the government's legitimate interest in a
special needs context. 103 The Court applied this same line of reasoning in
Earls when'deciding the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing for
students participating in any extracurricular activity.104
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court decided Earls in a five to four decision. 105 Justice
Thomas wrote the majority opinion.106 Justice Ginsberg wrote the dissent-
ing opinion joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter.107 The Court
held that students who participate in extracurricular activities could be
subject to random drug testing as a reasonable means of furthering a school
district's interest in preventing and detecting drug use among its students. 108
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority began its analysis by recognizing that probable cause is
not required for a constitutionally valid search when "in the context of safe-
ty and administrative regulations" special needs exist. 109 The Court then
99. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664 (1989).
100. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1997).
101. Id.
102. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
103. Id. at 652-53.
104. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 827 (2002).
105. Id. at 824-25.
106. Id. at 825.
107. Id. at 824-25.
108. Id. at 825.
109. Id. at 829; see also Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Skin-
ner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 873 (1987).
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noted that the respondents did not focus on a basis of probable cause for the
search, but they instead argued that some level of individualized suspicion
should be required for the drug-testing scheme to be constitutional under
the Fourth Amendment.110 The Court disagreed with this argument and
stated that "while schoolchildren Jo not shed their constitutional rights
when they enter the schoolhouse... Fourth Amendment rights.., are dif-
ferent in public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry cannot
disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.""Il
The Court concluded that special needs existed in the public school
context. 112 Thus, reasonableness, which was determined by a balancing
test, was necessary instead of individualized suspicion."l 3 The Court
applied the Vernonia fact-specific balancing test, which weighed the nature
and character of the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights against the
government's legitimate interest.1 14
Under the first part of the test,115 the Court determined that a student's
privacy interest was limited when the state was responsible for maintaining
discipline, health, and safety, as in a public school environment. 116 The
Court noted that in Vernonia, students participating in athletics, unlike other
members of the student population, had even further reduced expectations
of privacy due to the communal undress that was part of athletics and
because the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to preseason physicals
and a higher degree of regulation than other students." 17 Therefore, the
Court reasoned that students participating in any type of extracurricular
activity were like athletes because the activities require occasional off-
campus travel and communal undress, and participants voluntarily subject
110. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 829 (2002).
111. Id. at 829-30 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
112. Id. at 829.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 830; see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
115. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (considering the nature of the privacy interest that was
compromised by the School District's drug testing policy).
116. Id.; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell wrote:
Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to
educate their students. And apart from education, the school has the obligation to pro-
tect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers them-
selves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has prompted
national concern.
Id.
117. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (indicating that athletes have
a higher degree of regulation from the rest of the student population because of codes of conduct,
dress codes, and maintenance of grade point averages)).
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themselves to additional rules and requirements that do not apply to the
general population of students. " 8
Because non-athletic extracurricular activities are regulated and may
have off-campus activities and communal undress, the students affected by
the Policy had a diminished expectation of privacy.1 9 The Court stated that
although the limited expectation of privacy existed, it "was not essential" in
Vernonia. 20 Instead, the Court reasoned that the custodial aspect of the
school was more important in analyzing the nature of the intrusion, but the
Court did not discuss the subject in detail.1
2 1
The Court then discussed the character of the intrusion imposed by the
Policy, stating that its reasonableness depended upon the drug test itself and
its application. 22 The Policy required a faculty monitor while standing out-
side the closed restroom stall waiting for the students to produce the sample
to "listen for the normal sounds of urination in order to guard against
tampered specimens and to insure an accurate chain of custody." 123" After
the sample was given to the monitor, it was then placed into two bottles that
were sealed and enclosed in a mailing envelope along with the student's
signed consent form.124 The drug test in Earls was less intrusive, according
to the Court, than the one used in Vernonia because male students were
allowed to produce a sample behind a closed restroom stall instead of an
open urinal.125 Given that the collection of urine samples was considered a
"negligible" intrusion in Vernonia, the Court quickly dismissed the notion
that the collection of samples in Earls was problematic because male
students were given more privacy than their counterparts in Vernonia.1
26
The second issue in determining reasonableness of the character of the
intrusion was the application of the test result.127 The Policy required confi-
dential files of the drug test results to be kept separately from the students'
other records.128 In addition to separate files, the results were not released
118. Id. at 831-32.
119. Id. at 832.
120. Id. at 831.
121. See id. (noting that schools' primary responsibility was educating students, but they
were also obligated to protect students in their care as well as protect teachers from violent
students, and this could not be accomplished unless the schools first had discipline and order).
122. Id. at 832.
123. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 199, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 832-33.
126. Id.; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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to school personnel except on a "need to know" basis.129 In practice, how-
ever, the test results were given to all coaches and activity sponsors, which
was a departure from Vernonia where only the athletic directors were noti-
fied. 130 The Court accepted this disclosure because the sponsors needed to
know if any of the students under their care were taking medication.131 The
Court indicated that the character of the intrusion was minimal because the
test results were not given to any law enforcement agency nor used for any
internal disciplinary function.132
Continuing its drug test result application analysis, the Court addressed
the respondents' arguments that the Policy did not provide adequate protec-
tion against the disclosure of confidential information and that the School
District did not act responsibly to protect that information. 33 Earls pre-
sented a situation where an extracurricular activity sponsor was given the
students' list of prescription drugs that must be disclosed on a consent form
prior to drug testing and left them where other students could view the
information. 134 The Court stated that one act of alleged carelessness did not
increase the character of the intrusion. 135 However, the Court did suggest
that if the School District was sufficiently careless in protecting the stu-
dents' drug testing information, the balance might tip in the other
direction. 136
Summarizing the first two prongs of the balancing test, the Court
reasoned that students had a lower level of privacy expectation in general,
and that expectation was diminished further for students participating in
athletics or extracurricular activities.137 The Court found that schools' cus-
todial duties were more significant than the privacy expectation in the
129. Id.
130. Brief for Respondent at 24, Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332).
131. Earls, 536 U.S. at 833.
132. See id. (concluding that the invasion of students' privacy was not significant because
of the limited uses to which the test results were put). The Court stated:
[T]he only consequence of a failed drug test is to limit the student's privilege of
participating in extracurricular activities. Indeed a student may test positive for drugs
twice and still be allowed to participate in extracurricular activities .... Only after a
third positive test will the student be suspended from participating in any extra-
curricular activity for the remainder of the school year, or 88 school days, whichever is
longer.
Id. at 833-34.
133. Id. at 833.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id. (stating that one example of carelessness does not increase the character of the
intrusion).
137. Id. at 831-32.
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analysis. 138 In light of this lower expectation level, the Court reasoned that
the intrusiveness of collecting the urine sample for drug testing was similar
to an individual's use of a public restroom and therefore "negligible."'
39
The Court also determined that the drug test results were punitive only in
respect to extracurricular activities.140 In conclusion, the Court determined
that the invasion of the students' privacy was minimal because of the
school's custodial responsibilities, the nature of the sample collection, and
"the limited uses to which the test results [were] put."' 4 '
The Court then discussed the third part of the reasonableness test-the
legitimate interest of the School District and whether the Policy was
effective in addressing that interest. 142 The Court agreed with its reasoning
in Vernonia that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is of national con-
cern. 143 The Court then determined that the health and safety risks stated in
Vernonia also applied to the schoolchildren in Earls.144 Therefore, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the School District's drug testing
policy for students participating in extracurricular activities as furthering
the District's interest in preventing and deterring drug use among
schoolchildren. 145
The Court favored an evaluation based on national drug use, such as
the one in Skinner, instead of the more fact-specific evaluation that was
used in Vernonia.146 Using evidence that drug use among the youth of the
nation has increased and not abated since Vernonia, the Court said that the
national drug epidemic "makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in
every school."' 147 Therefore, the Court reasoned a school could institute
drug testing among students without significant evidence of a drug abuse
138. Id.
139. Id. at 832-33.
140. Id. at 833.
141. Id. at 834.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1995)). The deter-
rence of drug use among schoolchildren "is at least as important as enhancing efficient enforce-
ment of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs." Id.
144. Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-62).
145. Id. at 837.
146. Id. at 834-36; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 609
(1989) (instituting a drug testing policy for railroad employees because of the national problem of
drug and alcohol abuse causing train accidents); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 (implementing a drug
testing policy for students participating in athletics due to a drug epidemic of great proportions
among the athletes subjected to the test).
147. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 834 (2002).
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problem within the school.148 Using the reasoning in Von Raab and Skin-
ner, the Court determined that the need for prevention and deterrence of
drug use "provides the necessary immediacy for a school testing policy." 149
The Court then reasoned that waiting for a drug abuse problem to occur
made little sense when the point of the testing program was to deter drug
use. 150
The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit's approach requiring a dem-
onstrated drug abuse problem among the students subjected to the test. 151
The Court reasoned a specific threshold of drug use was not required to
institute testing, but some evidence was necessary to "shore up the need for
its testing program."152 The Court focused almost exclusively on the fact
that drug abuse was a problem facing the nation as a whole and declined to
"second-guess the finding of the District Court that the [School District]
was faced with a 'drug problem' when it adopted the Policy," even though
most of the evidence was based on hearsay or was dated and irrelevant. 153
The Court concluded that it could not dictate a specific amount of drug
use needed to justify a drug-testing program for schoolchildren. 5 4 Quoting
Vernonia, the Court said that "the necessity for the State to act is magnified
by the fact that this evil [drug use] is being visited not just upon individuals
148. Id. at 835. The Court stated that '"a demonstrated problem of drug abuse... [is] not
in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime,' but ... some showing does 'shore up an
assertion of special need for a suspicionless general search program."' Id. (quoting Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)).
149. Id. at 836. Respondents argued that very few incidents reported by the school involved
drug use, but the Court determined that a "pervasive drug problem" was not necessary in order to
implement a drug testing policy. See Id. at 835 (presenting testimony that students were be under
the influence of drugs, that marijuana cigarettes were found near the school parking lot by a drug
sniffing dog, and that drugs or drug paraphernalia were found in a car driven by a student). The
Court quoted a passage from Von Raab:
The Court upheld the drug testing of customs officials on a purely preventative basis,
without any documented history of drug use by such officials. The Court noted
generally that drug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting our society
today, and that programs to prevent and detect drug use among customs officials could
not be deemed unreasonable.
Id. (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673 (1989)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278
(10th Cir. 2001)).
152. Id. at 835.
153. Id. at 835. Of the students tested in the program's first year, only three out of 243
students tested positive for drug use, and in the second year, only one out of 241 participating
students tested positive. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1272-75.
154. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (refusing to "fashion what would in effect be a constitutional quantum of
drug use necessary to show a 'drug problem."').
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at large, but upon children for whom it has undertaken a special
responsibility of care and direction."155
The Court then addressed the safety aspect of drug use among students
participating in extracurricular activities.156 The decision in Vernonia was
tailored specifically to athletes because the risk of injury was much greater
when athletes use drugs.157 There were possibly some extracurricular
activities that posed a safety issue similar to the athletes in Vernonia, but
many students were involved in extracurricular activities that posed no
substantial safety risk.158 The Court factored safety into the analysis on a
very broad basis, stating that drug use created a myriad of health risks for
children, including death; therefore, the safety interest furthered by drug
testing policies was substantial for all children. 159
Next, the Court rejected the respondents' argument that individualized
reasonable suspicion was necessary for a drug testing policy because it
would be less intrusive if only suspected users were tested.160 The Court
recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not require individualized
suspicion in a special needs context and questioned whether a test based on
individualized suspicion would actually be less intrusive. 161 The Court re-
jected the less intrusive argument due to the "additional burden" it would
place on public school teachers who already have a difficult job maintaining
order and discipline. 162
The Court also reasoned that requiring individualized suspicion as a
means of limiting the intrusiveness of the search might result in the target-
ing of students in unpopular groups. 163 Thus, schools would fear lawsuits
from the searches, which in turn might "chill enforcement of the program,
155. Id. at 834 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995)).
156. Id. at 836-37.
157. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662. "Apart from psychological effects, which include impair-
ment of judgment, slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular
drugs screened by the District's Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks
to athletes." Id.
158. Earls, 536 U.S. at 846 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277
(commenting that "it is difficult to imagine how participants in vocal choir, or the academic team,
or even the [Future Homemakers of America] are in physical danger if they compete in those
activities while using drugs, any more than any student is at risk simply from using drugs").
159. Earls, 536 U.S. at 836-37.
160. Id. at 837.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1995) (rejecting
the student-athlete's proposal of individualized suspicion because of the risk that teachers will use
drug testing as a means of controlling difficult students that are not drug users, thereby generating
an unnecessary expense in defending lawsuits charging an arbitrary imposition, as well as,
increasing the duties of schoolteachers by adding the function of locating and bringing to account
drug users).
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rendering it ineffective in combating drug use."164 According to the Court,
the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment does not require use
of the least intrusive means because it would "raise insuperable barriers to
the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers."165
Balancing all factors, the Court determined that the School District's
policy of drug testing students who participated in extracurricular activities
was an effective means of addressing the school's concerns in preventing,
deterring, and detecting drug use. 166 The Court stated that the drug problem
in Vernonia was a "closer fit" and was exacerbated because of the athletes'
"role model" effect on other students, but it was not essential to the
ruling. 167
B. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority's reasoning, but emphasized
some underlying considerations in his concurrence.168 First, he agreed with
the Court that there was a need for the School District's drug testing policy
because the nation's drug problem in schools was serious. 169 Second, he
emphasized that government was not successful in reducing teen drug use
by focusing on the supply side of interdiction and, therefore, other
possibilities should be explored.170 Third, he noted that today's public ex-
pects schools to provide meals, before and after school care, and medical
and psychological services in addition to teaching children the basics.171
Unless the public school system provides these services in a safe environ-
ment, parents will remove their children from public schools and place
them in private or parochial schools with financing from the state. 172
Lastly, he pointed out that a drug testing policy like the one enacted by the
School District could reduce peer pressure on students. Specifically, it
could reduce peer pressure on adolescent students by giving them a reason
164. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837.
165. Id. (quoting Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976)); see also
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (stating that "a showing of
individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed
unreasonable").
166. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38.
167. Id. (stating that Vernonia did not require schools to test the student group most likely
to use drugs, "but rather considered the constitutionality of the program in the context of the
public school's custodial responsibilities").
168. Id. at 838-39 (Breyer, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 839 (citing facts and statistics regarding the cost of drug use and the percentage
of students using illegal drugs).
170. Id.




to say no to drugs in a non-threatening way-by invoking the need to
comply with the Policy in order to participate in an extracurricular
activity. 173
In regard to the issue of privacy, Justice Breyer disagreed with the
Court's conclusion that the intrusion was "negligible" when a monitor
watched the urine collection process.174 He determined that whether the
intrusion was "negligible" depended on the individual.175 In order to solve
the privacy dilemma, the public should be given an opportunity to discuss
the issue and should be included in the development of the drug-testing
program.176 The drug-testing program should only include those students
who want to participate in an extracurricular activity.177
Justice Breyer stated that the consequence for objecting to the drug test
was serious, but not as severe as an expulsion from school. 178 He was also
concerned with interpreting the Constitution as requiring "individualized
suspicion" in the public school context. 179 He emphasized that requiring
individualized suspicion could lead to "subjective criteria" when im-
plementing a drug-testing program, thereby pushing the boundaries of indi-
vidualized suspicion.180 Although Justice Breyer declined to state whether
the program had the possibility of success, he concluded that it was not
unreasonable and the Constitution did not prevent the attempt to reduce
drug use through a testing program. 18'
C. JUSTICE GINSBERG'S DISSENT
Justice Ginsberg disapproved of the Court's reliance upon Vernonia to
uphold a drug-testing program implemented to reduce the School District's
drug problem when the Superintendent of the District denied such a
problem existed. 82 She concluded that the testing program was not reason-
able because it targeted a "student population least likely to be at risk from
illicit drugs and their damaging effects."183
Justice Ginsberg noted that the Court "emphasized that drug use
'increase[d] the risk of sports-related injury"' in Vernonia, yet the Policy in
173. Id. at 840-41.





179. id. at 841-42.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 842.
182. Id. at 843 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
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Earls allowed drug testing for a student participating in a non-athletic extra-
curricular activity that posed no "special dangers from, nor particular
predilections for, drug use." 184 No one will argue that drug use is not a
health risk for any child, but when athletics are involved, the potential
damage to the body is significantly higher.185
Justice Ginsberg agreed that when special needs exist in the public
school system, the test for a suspicionless search is reasonableness under all
the circumstances. 186 However, she argued that the majority would have
come to a different conclusion if it had properly analyzed all of the facts.187
First, Justice Ginsberg argued that the majority erred in its analysis of
the privacy intrusion on students involved in an extracurricular activity
other than athletics.188 Vernonia stated that athletes' expectations of
privacy are lessened because of communal undressing and hygiene in locker
rooms and "[s]chool sports are not for the bashful."189 However, unlike
athletics, students participating in extracurricular activities, like choir,
marching band, and academic team, do not share the same privacy issues. 190
On the occasional trip, students must share hotel rooms and use common
bathrooms, but the situations are "hardly equivalent to the routine
communal undress associated with athletics."191
Second, Justice Ginsberg argued that the majority erred in its analysis
of the privacy intrusion caused by the Policy's process of collecting and
disseminating students' personal information.192 Justice Ginsberg noted
that in Vernonia, athletes were required to disclose any prescription medica-
tions prior to the drug test, and the Vernonia Court assumed that the School
District allowed the students to submit the information in a confidential
184. Id. at 843 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995)).
Physical exertion is not a typical characteristic of most non-athletic, extracurricular activities;
therefore, drug-using students in these activities are no more likely to injure themselves or others
than are student drug users who are not engaging in extracurricular activities. Id. at 851-52.
185. Id. at 845 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662 (stating that amphetamines produce an in-
crease in blood pressure and heart rate, a constriction of the peripheral vessels such as arms and
legs, and masks the normal fatigue response, making amphetamines an extremely dangerous drug
when combined with physical exercise)). Marijuana causes blood pressure problems when the
body changes position, the oxygen-carrying capacity of blood is reduced, and normal sweating re-
sponses are inhibited causing a body temperature increase. Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662).
Cocaine produces an increase in blood pressure and restriction of the vessels, possibly causing
heart spasms and heart attacks. Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662).
186. Id. at 843
187. Id. at 846-47.
188. Id. at 847.
189. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 847-48.
192. Id. at 848.
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manner. 193 She then argued that the majority based its decision regarding a
negligible invasion of privacy on that same assumption. 194
However, the respondents alleged that the School District was careless
in handling personal information and distributed it to all activity sponsors
whether there was a need or not, even though the Policy required infor-
mation to be submitted in a confidential envelope to the lab with no disclo-
sure to district employees. 95 In granting summary judgment to the School
District, the Court assumed that the confidentiality provisions would be
honored, and under the circumstances, the "assumption [was] unwarranted"
and should not have been made at this stage because there was doubt.196
Justice Ginsberg also argued that the School District's claimed interest
was not legitimate. 97 Unlike Vernonia, where the athletes were fueling a
drug culture of enormous magnitude for the School District to face, the
School District in Earls had no demonstrated problem of drug abuse.198
Justice Ginsberg noted that the districts had "drug problems of distinctly
different magnitudes" and chose to confront them in different ways. 199 The
Vernonia School District chose to test only the athletes, thereby limiting the
policy; whereas, the Tecumseh School District chose to test all students
participating in an extracurricular activity.200
Justice Ginsberg then argued that the majority left out an element
necessary to the Vernonia decision by stating that the safety interest was
substantial and similar for all children whether athletes or non-athletes. 201
The missing element was the combination of physical activity with illicit
drug use.202 Justice Ginsberg wrote, "[N]o policy of random drug testing is
perfectly tailored to the harms it seeks to address[, but] ... [tihere is a
difference between imperfect tailoring and no tailoring at all." 203
193. Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 848-49.
196. Id. at 849. "On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying
facts contained in [affidavits, attached exhibits, and depositions] must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655
(1962).
197. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 849 (2002).
198. Id. at 849-50 (stating that the School District reported to the federal government that
drugs were present in its schools, but that there was no major problem with drugs other than
alcohol and tobacco).
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This statement referred to the Tecumseh School District's argument
that band members and members of Future Farmers of America are similar
to athletes because they perform physical routines when carrying instru-
ments and handling large animals. 204 Justice Ginsberg likened this argu-
ment to athletes tested in Vernonia, such as golfers and sprinters, where the
danger posed by drugs was marginal. 205 However, the drug testing in
Vernonia affected few athletes at a low risk of physical harm. 206 Whereas,
the drug testing in Earls primarily affected participants with a low level of
physical harm; therefore, no tailoring at all existed for the drug testing
policy. 207
Justice Ginsberg then recognized that Vernonia had two reasons for
instituting a drug testing policy: (1) the athletes faced serious health risks,
and (2) the athletes were leading the drug culture.2 08 No similar reasoning
existed in Earls to justify a drug testing policy. 209 Justice Ginsberg stated
that the Policy was not a deterrent because statistics show that students
participating in extracurricular activities are not likely to have substance
abuse problems.210 Implementing the Policy deters students that are most
likely to be helped by participating in activities and invades the privacy of
students who are least at risk.211
In summary, Justice Ginsberg stated that the only similarity between
Vernonia and Earls was that both school districts' testing policies were for
activities outside the required curriculum. 2 12 "A program so sweeping [as
Earls] is not sheltered by Vernonia; its unreasonable reach renders it
impermissible under the Fourth Amendment." 2 13
In Part II of her dissent, Justice Ginsberg argued that the Earls' drug
testing policy was most similar to that of Chandler,214 where candidates
running for state office were required to pass a drug test.215 Earls was simi-
lar to Chandler because the Policy did not advance the special needs in the
public school context of discipline and maintaining order.216 Instead, the
204. Id. at 851-52.
205. Id. at 852.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649).
209. Id. at 852-53.
210. Id. at 853.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 853.
213. Id. at 854.
214. Id.





purpose in Earls was communicating the School District's strong dislike of
drug abuse, but communication does not "trump the right of persons-even
of children within the schoolhouse gate-to be 'secure in their persons...
against unreasonable searches and seizures."'
217
IV. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's decision in Earls may open the door for sus-
picionless drug testing of all students, not just those involved in extra-
curricular activities. 218 This is because the Court did not limit its decision
to students involved in extracurricular activities, but suggested that the
special needs of schools may justify the testing of all students.219 While
emphasizing the "special needs" of the school, the Court rejected arguments
that limited its reasoning to the testing of extracurricular participants and
suggested that schools will be able to implement broader drug testing
policies as long as they serve the school's "important interest in detecting
and preventing drug use." 220
The Court focused on the "special needs" of public schools when
analyzing its "fact-specific balancing test."221 Justice Thomas emphasized
the School District's "important interest in preventing and deterring drug
use among its schoolchildren." 222 He described the classification of the
tested group as a "supplemental" factor and stated that the school context
was the "most significant element" when determining the reasonableness of
a drug testing policy.223 Because the Court gave such prominence to the
school's needs, it makes it difficult to establish a limit at which the privacy
invasion would be substantial enough to invalidate a drug testing policy.224
217. Id. at 854-55 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
218. See Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'I High Sch., 803 A.2d 706, 712 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002) (holding that the school's policy of requiring drug tests for students with driving
permits who want to park on campus was constitutional); see also Neil Lewis, The Supreme
Court: Student Rights; Court's Stance on Searches Evolves, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2002, at Al
(stating that the reasoning in Earls would allow a random search of the entire student population
according to legal scholars and some of the justices).
219. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 839-40 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that public schools must find an effective
way to deal with adolescent drug use, and drug testing policies were reasonable because of the
school's custodial responsibilities of children).
220. Id. at 825.
221. Id. at 829-30. "The context of the public school environment serves as the backdrop
for the analysis of the privacy interest at stake and the reasonableness of the drug testing policy in
general." Id. at 830.
222. Id. at 838.
223. Id. at 830-31 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995)).
Similarly, Justice Breyer argued that the government's role of teacher and caretaker arms it with
expansive authority unmatched outside of the schools. Id. at 840 (Breyer, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 830-3 1.
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The majority's "special needs" analysis was a broad argument and did
not exclusively justify the testing of extracurricular participants. 225  An
example of this includes Justice Thomas' emphasis on the School District's
need to protect the health and safety of its students.226 The Court stated that
"the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly substantial for
all children, athletes and non-athletes alike." 227 This seems to suggest that
all students can be subjected to suspicionless drug tests in order to advance
the interest of protecting their health and safety. 228
Maintaining order and discipline in schools was also important to the
Court.229 If the school's interest was promoting drug abstinence among its
"role model" students, then maintaining order and discipline might differ-
entiate participants in extracurricular activities from the rest of the students;
however, this would not limit Earl's rationale to extracurricular partici-
pants.230 The majority did not require evidence of a drug problem among
the participating students because of the school's need for discipline and
order.231 Instead, the Court approved of purely preventative drug testing
programs.232 There is a strong argument that students who do not partici-
pate in extracurricular activities are at greater risk and generally need
additional supervision.233 If schools are allowed to implement drug testing
225. Id. at 834-35.
226. Id. at 834.
227. Id. at 836. Justice Ginsberg stated that the health and safety risks cited by the majority
are present for all schoolchildren." Id. at 844 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 834-36; see also David Schimmel, J.D., Supreme Court Expands Random Drug
Testing: Does the Fourth Amendment Still Protect Students?, 170 ED. L. REP. 15, 25 (2002)
(stating that the majority in Earls used the health and safety rationale to allow schools "wide
discretion" in implementing suspicionless drug testing).
229. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 830-31 (2002).
230. Id.
231. Id. According to the Court, proving that a drug problem exists is "not in all cases
necessary to the validity of a testing regime." Id. at 835 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 319 (1997)).
232. Id. at 834-36. Evidence of drug use is only relevant if a court finds that a school
district must "shore up an assertion of special need." Id. at 835 (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at
319); cf. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 (stating that the identity of the student group tested was "not
essential to our decision in Vernonia").
233. Nicholas Zill et al., Adolescent Time Use, Risky Behavior and Outcomes: An Analysis
of National Data (Sept. 11, 1995), available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/cyp/xstimuse.htm.
Recent studies suggest that participants in extracurricular activities are less likely to engage in
drug use than nonparticipants. Id.
A government study of adolescent use of leisure time found that participation in
extracurricular activities helps reduce student involvement in risky activities, such as
drug use, by reducing their after-school free time. For example, in comparison to
those who spent 1-4 hours per week in extracurricular activities, the 10th graders
studied were: 57 percent more likely to have dropped out by the time they would have
been seniors; 49 percent more likely to have used drugs; 37 percent more likely to
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programs to monitor role model students without evidence of a drug
problem, the Court would likely allow drug testing for troublesome students
or students who create discipline problems. 23
4
Before Earls, the Court required a relationship between the school's
needs and the privacy invasion created by the search. 235 The Fourth
Amendment's requirement of reasonableness generally "ensure[s] that the
interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve
the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools." 236 In Earls, the Court
declined to require a relationship between a school's needs and its means to
address the drug problem.237 This lack of a relationship suggests that
schools could craft their drug testing programs without narrowly tailoring
them to a specific group of students because "the Fourth Amendment does
not require employing the least intrusive means." 238
The Court believed that the group composition selected for suspicion-
less drug testing was a "supplemental" factor in the special needs balancing
test.239 Because the Court believed that the national crisis of teen substance
abuse was addressed by drug testing programs, school districts will likely
be able to demonstrate a special need to subject their average or trouble-
some students to the same tests applied to extracurricular participants.240
According to the Court, students' voluntary participation in extra-
curricular activities led to a diminished expectation of privacy, and was
have become teen parents; 35 percent more likely to have smoked cigarettes; and 27
percent more likely to have been arrested. Further the study found different relation-
ships among various activities and risky behaviors: whereas student athletes were
more likely to have engaged in binge drinking, students who participated in band,
orchestra, chorus, or in a school play or musical were significantly less likely to
engage in that or nearly any other problem activity.
Id.
234. See id. (stating that students not involved in extracurricular activities are more likely to
be involved with drugs); see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 853 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that
drug testing policies would have an adverse effect because high-achieving and drug free students
might forfeit the benefits of participation, and students most in need of the benefits of
extracurricular activities would be deterred from participating).
235. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
236. Id.; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (stat-
ing that "[in limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are mini-
mal, and where an important government interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the
absence of such suspicion"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1968) (measuring the severity of
the privacy intrusion against the weight of the justification offered for the invasion).
237. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-38. Justice Thomas wrote that the Fourth Amendment does not
"require the school to test the group of students most likely to use drugs, but rather consider[s] the
constitutionality of the program in the context of the public school's custodial responsibilities."
Id. at 838.
238. Id. at 837.
239. ld. at 831 n.3.
240. See id. at 837-39 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing evidence of a national drug epidemic).
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another way of distinguishing extracurricular participants from the general
student body.241 Under this theory, voluntariness seems to provide a drug
testing policy limit, but when analyzed, it may not provide a clear limit for
two reasons.
242
First, students have the same expectation of privacy when shielding
basic urinary functions whether a participant in an extracurricular activity or
a member of the general student population.243 A choir member may agree
to a special set of attendance and uniform requirements, but that does not
reduce the expectation that urinating in the restroom would be a private
activity. 244 Some extracurricular activities offer "occasional off-campus
travel," but not all extracurricular activities do, nor do the majority of
extracurricular activities impose a reduction in privacy through communal
undress.245 Therefore, the reduced privacy expectation based on a student's
voluntary participation in an extracurricular activity was not related to the
privacy invasion required by the drug testing policy. 246
Second, students not participating in voluntary extracurricular activities
engage in other types of voluntary activities each day, including driving to
241. See id. at 832-33 (emphasizing the physical aspects of the urine collection process in
determining the privacy interest); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617
(1989) (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
1987)) (stating that "the passing of urine" was an extremely personal and private activity). This
physical-effects approach narrowly construes the "dignitary interest" in privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1021 (1995) (describing invasions of the dignitary privacy
interest as those acts that "stigmatize the individual, single him out, and deprive him of freedom").
Viewing privacy in this manner, even a policy that tested all students would be an "insignificant"
invasion. See Tannahill ex rel. Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 929
(N.D. Tex. 2001) (striking down a blanket random testing regime for all sixth through twelfth
grade students because the school district did not demonstrate sufficient "special needs," but
finding that the intrusion upon students' privacy interest... is low").
242. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831-32.
243. See Brief for Respondent at 5, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332) (stating that the respondent felt
embarrassed because teachers were listening and talking about "potty training" while she was
urinating). Once the sample was produced, teachers examined it for temperature, color, and
clarity. Id. "This collection and close examination of bodily fluid by a teacher whom [respon-
dent] would regularly see at school is hardly equivalent ... to the normal process of using a public
restroom." Id.
244. See Theodore v. Delaware Valley Sch. Dist., 761 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (citing Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. I v. Lopez by and through Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1108
(Colo. 1998)) (stating that a student usually chooses when to use the restroom, that a student uses
the restroom in private without a monitor listening for sounds of urination, and that a student does
not have to urinate in a container on demand).
245. David J. Gottlieb, Drug Testing, Collective Suspicion, and a Fourth Amendment Out of
Balance: A Reply to Professor Howard, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 32-33 (Winter 1997).
"Mandatory participation in physical education programs and the use of locker rooms is a part of
the life of virtually all high school students." Id.
246. Earls, 536 U.S. at 845-47 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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and parking in the school parking lot, attending sporting events and dances,
and buying food from the cafeteria.247 It is difficult to distinguish a student
who voluntarily participates in an extracurricular activity where special
rules apply and is subject to a drug test from a student who chooses to
attend the homecoming dance where special rules apply but is not subject to
a drug test.248 However, Justice Breyer suggests that under a voluntariness
theory, drug-testing policies would likely be allowed as long as they "pre-
serve an option for a conscientious objector," 249 even if they did not require
testing for the whole student population. 250
Justice Breyer's concurrence provided insight into the extent of school
districts' testing authority.251 Justice Breyer argued that the School Dis-
trict's "democratic, participatory process" provided little to no objection to
the drug-testing regime, thus enhancing its claim of "reasonableness." 252
Using this theory, school districts wanting to implement broad testing
policies could safeguard their programs by utilizing a school board vote that
was democratic in nature.253 School districts could then make the argument
that testing all students was the only way to avoid the perception of
discrimination. 254
Lastly, Justice Breyer's interpretation of "special needs" seems bold
enough to allow more invasive drug testing programs.255 School districts
need "to discourage demand for drugs by ... combat[ing] the single most
important factor leading school children to take drugs, namely, peer
pressure."256 Using this reasoning, school districts could argue that non-
participating students, those most susceptible to peer pressure, should be
247. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHAT You NEED To KNOW ABOUT
DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS 12 (2002), (hereinafter CONTROL POLICY) (noting that some schools
have already initiated testing regimes that require all students seeking a parking pass to submit to
urinalysis drug tests).
248. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 831-32 (stating that ["extracurricular activities] have their own
rules and requirements for participating students that do not apply to the student body as a
whole").
249. Id. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring).
250. Cf Tannahill ex rel. Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 929
(N.D. Tex. 2001) (finding that required attendance at school is much different than voluntary
participation in extracurricular activities).
251. Earls, 536 U.S. at 838-39 (Breyer, J. concurring).
252. Id. at 841.
253. Id.; see also CONTROL POLICY, supra note 249, at 6. A recent executive policy
manual urges schools engaging in new testing programs to seek "plenty of public input" in order
to "strengthen the testing program and improve its chances of success." Id.
254. Earls, 536 U.S. at 841-42 (Breyer, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 839-40.
256. Id. at 840.
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given the same incentives to refrain from drug use as those given to athletes
and extracurricular activity members. 257
However, it is not likely that the Court would uphold a blanket testing
regime with punitive disciplinary consequences. 258  Both the Earls'
majority and Justice Breyer's concurrence stressed that the School District's
drug testing policy did not impose punitive academic consequences or law
enforcement involvement. 259 Separating administrative searches from legal
consequences has its history in several special needs cases. 260 The Fourth
Amendment seems to require schools to use counseling, parent meetings,
and suspension of participation in normal activities instead of punitive
academic or legal sanctions. 261 Therefore, as long as school districts craft
their drug testing programs to include voluntary participation, non-punitive
consequences, and some type of enhanced need, the Court's decision in
Earls indicates that the drug testing program will likely allow testing of the
entire student population. 262
V. CONCLUSION
In each case in which the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless random
drug testing policies before Earls, it did so only after specific evidence
257. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
258. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 831-34 (stressing that the consequences of a failed drug test
were to put a limit on the student's participation in the activity).
259. Id. "[T]he only consequence of a failed drug test is to limit the student's privilege of
participating in extracurricular activities." Id. at 833. After a failed drug test, the student may
continue to participate in the activity if proof is shown that the student engaged in drug
counseling. Id. When a second test is failed, the student is suspended from participating in the
activity for fourteen days and must submit to four hours of substance abuse counseling and agreed
to monthly drug tests. Id. at 834. A third failed test suspends the individual from participating in
the extracurricular activity for the remainder of the year or eighty-eight days, whichever is longer.
Id. at 834, 841 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the School District's policy offered the
conscientious objector a price "less severe than expulsion from the school"); cf. Oral Argument
Transcript, Earls (No. 01-332), 2002 WL 485032, at *26 (Mar. 19, 2002) (argument of Deputy
Solicitor General Clement) (stating that a drug test, as long as a positive result only required
confidential notification to the parents, would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment).
260. See, e.g., Feguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (recognizing the
"threat of arrest and prosecution" and the "extensive involvement of law enforcement officers" in
determining that a hospital's drug testing program "simply does not fit within the closely guarded
category of 'special needs"'); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995)
(emphasizing that "the search here is undertaken for prophylactic and distinctly nonpunitive pur-
poses"); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (upholding a
drug testing policy for the Customs Service, but indicating that "[tlest results may not be used in a
criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee's consent").
261. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-34. The Bush Administration has encouraged schools to
adopt drug-testing programs that comply with this interpretation of Earls. See CONTROL POLICY,
supra note 249, at 4 (stating that "the goal of school-based drug testing is not to punish students
who use drugs," but rather "to deter use and guide those who test positive into counseling or
treatment").
262. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837-843.
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indicated a valid special need.263 Earls was the exception to that rule. 264
Although the Court applied the Vernonia test to the facts of Earls, it esta-
blished different reasons than those used in Vernonia in order to sub-
stantiate the decision. 265 The Court held that the School District's interest
in preventing drug abuse was sufficient to justify the suspicionless testing
program for students participating in extracurricular activities in light of the
nationwide drug epidemic, the evidence provided by the District that drug
abuse was a problem among its students, and the special responsibility
undertaken by the District to care for the children in its charge. 266
Lisa K. Brewster
263. Id. at 843-45 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 844 (stating that Earls presents "circumstances dispositively different").
265. Id. at 853-55; see also Lewis, supra note 220, at Al (stating that the Court's view of
suspicionless searches has evolved through the years, but Earls reverts back to 1985 where school
officials were allowed to conduct random searches to maintain order)..
266. Earls, 536 U.S. at 835-38.
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